# Aff

## AT: Uniqueness

### 2AC --- Pivot Fails

#### US is losing to China now – pivot fail inevitable – structural problems unrelated to the AFF.

Townshend and Crabtree ’22 (Mr. Townshend is a senior fellow for Indo-Pacific security at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Crabtree is executive director of the Asia office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The U.S. Is Losing Its Military Edge in Asia, and China Knows It”, New York Times, June 15, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/opinion/international-world/us-military-china-asia.html)

As China’s armed forces grow in strength, sophistication and confidence, U.S.-led military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is losing its bite. Take the United States’ military presence in the region. It has about 55,000 military personnel in Japan and 28,000 in South Korea. Several thousand more are deployed across Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Guam. This posture has barely changed since the 1950s. But plans to reinvigorate the U.S. presence have been stymied by inadequate budgets, competing priorities and a lack of consensus in Washington on how to deal with China. The Pentagon has increased investments in cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence, and cyber- and space-based systems to prepare for a possible high-tech conflict with China in the 2030s. But the balance of power is likely to shift decidedly in China’s favor by the time they are deployed unless the United States brings new resources to the table soon. President Biden this year submitted the largest defense budget ever in dollar terms, but much of the increase will be swallowed up by skyrocketing inflation. Mr. Biden, like former President Donald Trump, is thus falling short of a target of 3 percent to 5 percent real annual budget growth, a bipartisan goal set even before the Ukraine war and often cited as the minimum the Pentagon needs in today’s era of great-power competition. While the U.S. military is globally dispersed, China can concentrate its forces on winning a future conflict in its own neighborhood. It now has the capability. China has the world’s largest navy and Asia’s biggest air force and an imposing arsenal of missiles designed to deter the United States from projecting military power into the Western Pacific in a crisis. China’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier is nearing completion, and other new hardware is being developed or is already in service. Beijing is also raising alarm with its readiness to project that strength. While much attention is focused on its behavior toward Taiwan, China is building and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea. It also broke ground on an expanded naval port in Cambodia last week, which may one day provide its first military foothold in another Asian country. A security agreement with the Solomon Islands could lead to something similar, and Beijing is aggressively courting other Pacific nations. America’s military position in Asia, by contrast, has been hampered by decades of preoccupation with Middle East conflicts. The war in Ukraine has morphed into a long-term $54 billion commitment and forced Mr. Biden to delay and redraft his administration’s National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy — critical documents that lay out global priorities and resource needs — as officials grapple with how to manage China and Russia at the same time. Mr. Biden’s team ended the lengthy and costly U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, but that has not freed up many resources for the Indo-Pacific. Washington must not lose sight of the fact that China is a far greater security threat than Russia, now and in the long term.

## AT: Link

### 2AC --- NATO Counterbalance --- China Prioritization

#### NATO focusing on China now – no tradeoff

Wilson, Lawless, and Corbet 6-28 (The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business.” NATO pivots to highlight Chinese ‘challenges’ for 1st time”, The Associated Press, June 28, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-nato-taiwan-jens-stoltenberg-ab60b2843268edde1ec29c43d421a26f>)

NATO has for the first time singled out China as one of its strategic priorities for the next decade, warning about its growing military ambitions, confrontational rhetoric toward Taiwan and other neighbors, and increasingly close ties to Russia. While Russia’s war against Ukraine has dominated discussions at the NATO summit, China earned a place Wednesday among the Western alliance’s most worrying security concerns. “China is substantially building up its military forces, including nuclear weapons, bullying its neighbors, threatening Taiwan ... monitoring and controlling its own citizens through advanced technology, and spreading Russian lies and disinformation,” Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said after presenting NATO’s ten-year Strategic Concept. “China is not our adversary,” Stoltenberg said, “but we must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents.” The strategic document directed its harshest language at Russia, but the mere mention of China was significant; the 2010 document did not discuss China. The official turn by NATO puts the world’s largest military alliance based on the United States armed forces on guard against China, which has the world’s second-largest economy and a rapidly growing military, both in numbers and in top-notch technology. “One of the things that (China’s) doing is seeking to undermine the rules-based international order that we adhere to, that we believe in, that we helped build,” said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. “And if China’s challenging it in one way or another, we will stand up to that.” China has yet to condemn Russia’s four-month long war against Ukraine and has criticized sanctions brought against Moscow by NATO members. A year ago, Russia and China extended a friendship treaty promising even more “strategic cooperation” in defending their common interests. That was followed up in November with an agreement to strengthen their military ties. Weeks before Russia’s February invasion, Chinese leader Xi Jinping hosted his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin for a summit at which they pledged a partnership that had “no limits.” Western leaders are concerned that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine could embolden China to be more assertive over Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a part of its territory with no right to independent recognition as a state or representation on the world stage. Speaking at an event in Madrid that was not part of the NATO summit, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said that unless China is checked “there is a real risk that they draw the wrong idea which results in a catastrophic miscalculation such as invading Taiwan,” referring to the self-governing island that China claims as a province. However, in a move interpreted to show it was somewhat uneasy over the war in Ukraine, China voted to abstain in a United Nations motion to demand Russia halt its attack. China has greatly increased its diplomatic reach via foreign investment, above all in central Asia and Africa. Now it is seeking to match that with greater military might, especially in the South China Sea where it has built bases on disputed islands. The U.S. navy has pushed back by conducting drills in those waters.

### 2AC --- No Link --- No Tradeoff

#### The U.S. can split resources between Europe and Asia

Brumstrom & Martina, ‘22 (David Brumstrom is correspondent on U.S. Asia Policy for Reuters. He’s been reporting for four decades. Michael Martina is a graduate of Tshinga University, University of Florida and University of Washington. Now, he works as a political correspondent at Reuters. “U.S. can focus on two theaters - Indo-Pacific and war in Europe, official says,” Reuters, 2/28/22, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-can-focus-two-theaters-indo-pacific-war-europe-official-says-2022-02-28/>) -Alex

WASHINGTON, Feb 28 (Reuters) - The United States will keep its focus on the Indo-Pacific despite the Ukraine crisis, the White House Indo-Pacific policy coordinator said on Monday, adding Washington has been deeply engaged in two theaters simultaneously before, including during World War Two and the Cold War. Mira Rapp-Hooper, a director for U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy at the White House National Security Council, said she was confident that the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not divert from U.S. Indo-Pacific goals. "There is a way that the resources we are sending to Ukraine right now are actually quite distinct from what we are trying to do on the Indo Pacific strategy," she said. "That does not mean that we won’t feel moments of resource scarcity, but it does mean that we can plan both simultaneously."

#### No Tradeoff between Europe and Asia

Baker and Kanno-Youngs ’22 (Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent and has covered the last five presidents for The Times and The Washington Post. He also is the author of six books, most recently " Zolan Kanno-Youngs is a White House correspondent covering a range of domestic and international issues in the Biden White House, including homeland security and extremism. He joined The Times in 2019 as the homeland security correspondent.” “Biden Begins Trip to Asia Meant to Reassure Allies of Focus on China”, Th eNew York Times, May 19 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/us/politics/biden-trip-asia.html)

President Biden embarked Thursday on his first diplomatic mission to Asia since taking office, hoping to demonstrate that the United States remained focused on countering China, even as his administration stage-managed a war against Russia in Europe. With his original strategy of pivoting foreign policy attention to Asia effectively blown up by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Biden has now shifted to the argument that there can be no trade-off between Europe and Asia and that only the United States can bring together the democracies of the East and West to stand up to autocracy and aggression in both spheres. For Mr. Biden, finding his balance between the twin imperatives will require geopolitical maneuvering that would challenge any president. The competing demands on his time and attention were on display on Thursday as he squeezed in a last-minute meeting at the White House with the leaders of Sweden and Finland to welcome their decisions to join NATO before heading to Joint Base Andrews to board Air Force One for the long flight to South Korea. And days before that, Mr. Biden hosted Southeast Asian nations at the White House to detail new investments in clean energy and maritime assets, part of an effort to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific. “We are preparing for all contingencies, including the possibility that such a provocation would occur while we are in Korea or in Japan,” Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, told reporters this week before Mr. Biden departed Washington. Mr. Sullivan has consulted his counterpart in China in recent days to discuss, among other things, the prospect of a North Korean provocation. Mr. Biden’s trip is also aimed at reassuring allies in the region who were rattled by President Donald J. Trump’s unorthodox approach to Asia in recent years. Mr. Trump pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an American-negotiated regional trade pact meant to counter China’s growing economic sway. He repeatedly questioned American troop commitments to South Korea and the mutual defense agreement with Japan, while engaging in what he called a “love affair” with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Bruce Klingner, a longtime C.I.A. analyst on Asia now at the Heritage Foundation, said South Korea and Japan were increasingly nervous about North Korea’s capabilities and Mr. Trump’s threats to pull back from the region. “Biden should provide unequivocal assurances of U.S. dedication to the defense of our allies and affirm the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee of nuclear, conventional and missile defense forces,” he said. A couple of recent studies have concluded that even though American political influence in the region has risen again with Mr. Trump leaving power, the United States has continued to lose economic influence because of the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. “The biggest criticism of the administration in Asia right now is they have no economic strategy and they’re ceding the field to China,” said Michael J. Green, the incoming chief executive of the United States Studies Centre in Australia and a former Asia adviser to President George W. Bush. To address that, Mr. Biden plans to unveil a new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which is a pale shadow of a full-scale trade pact but will outline various mutual priorities like digital trade and supply chain security. American officials hope it will be joined by many of the countries still in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Mr. Green called that an important first step but one that behind the scenes, the Japanese, Australians and others find inadequate for the moment — although they are unlikely to say so publicly. “A lot of their interest is to show the U.S. is back and China is not going to write the economic rules,” Mr. Green said. Matthew P. Goodman, senior vice president for economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that if the Biden administration did not offer greater access to the American market, nations in the region would be looking for direct funding to expand infrastructure and the digital economy. “I think a lot of partners are going to look at that list and say: That’s a good list of issues. I’m happy to be involved,” said Mr. Goodman. “But, you know, are we going to get any tangible benefits out of participating in this framework?” In crafting the economic framework, Biden administration officials have focused in part on labor and environmental standards. But without the benefits of lowered trade barriers, other countries may be reluctant to make costly commitments. “The bottom line is the United States is not coming to the table with market access,” said Sheila A. Smith, a senior fellow for Asia-Pacific studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “And that’s the trade piece. That’s what the region is looking for.” During stops in Seoul and Tokyo, Mr. Biden will encounter two new partners who are both seen as more aligned with American priorities and likely to have good chemistry with the president, according to Mr. Green and other analysts and officials. The first, President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea, was inaugurated on May 10 and has taken a stronger approach to China and North Korea than his predecessor, while the second, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, was elected just last October and enjoys a level of popularity that is likely to keep him in office for the duration of Mr. Biden’s term, unlike the frequent revolving-door governments in Tokyo. “Inevitably North Korea is going to make itself front and center as part of the agenda for a Biden-Yoon summit,” said Scott A. Snyder, the director of U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Just the fact that that speculation is out there makes it necessary for the two leaders to talk about extended deterrence, how that works, and to try to deepen their shared commitment to security and defense.” While in Tokyo, Mr. Biden will also meet with other leaders of the so-called Quad — the United States, Japan, Australia and India — his second time sitting down with his counterparts in a bloc meant to resist Chinese hegemony in the region. With Australian elections scheduled for Saturday, it remained unclear who would attend the meeting, on Tuesday. But the most complicating factor may be how Mr. Biden approaches Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, who has been hesitant to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine out of fear of undermining security ties with Moscow. Moreover, Mr. Biden’s promise to combat autocracies around the world will be put to the test with Mr. Modi, who has marginalized and maligned minority Muslims. But the president’s aides said he can press the international campaign to thwart Russian aggression while still navigating the diplomatic complexities of the Asian-Pacific region and reaffirming America’s role in this part of the world. “He remains focused on ensuring that our efforts in those missions are successful,” said Mr. Sullivan, “but he also intends to seize this moment, this pivotal moment, to assert bold and confident American leadership in another vital region of the world.”

## AT: Impact

### 2AC --- Taiwan --- Invasion Inevitable

#### China invades Taiwan – cannot be deterred.

Saxty, ’22 (Jonathan Saxty is assistant editor of Brexit Watch, and writes for journals like the Telegraph, the Express and The Spectator. “Make no mistake China WILL invade Taiwan – and the world will be at war – JONATHAN SAXTY,” The Express, 4/25/22, <https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/1615688/China-Taiwan-invasion-US-Joe-Biden-military-Japan>) -Alex

To be clear, the CCP is absolutely committed to what it sees as retaking Taiwan. The leadership in Beijing has said so again and again, and to not do so could risk an incalculable loss of face. Don’t think that war in Ukraine has put China off. Chinese state media has not stopped telling the people how well it has been going for Russia – a policy likely to embolden Chinese public demands to invade Taiwan. Taiwan may well present difficulties but the island is still 16-times smaller than Ukraine and could be more easily blockaded to prevent supplies from getting in. Lose Taiwan to China and the US could lose the Western Pacific. Lose the Western Pacific - and apart from the huge loss of credibility among Asia-Pacific allies like Australia and Japan, and all the implications for them – and the US has lost its role as guarantor of the sea lanes, a huge component of the dominance of the dollar, a crown jewel of US economic might. Sticking with economics, any hopes the US has of ‘decoupling’ from China would take an enormous hit if Taiwan fell, given its outsized role in the semiconductor industry. Ending overreliance on Taiwan is not an overnight task either, any more than moving manufacturing away from China would be. There is a purpose behind this. China wants Taiwan, and unlike Russia over Ukraine, has made this crystal clear.

#### China is at its strongest right now and will invade Taiwan soon

Werlemen ’21 [CJ Werlemen, Global Correspondent for Byline Times, “A US-China War Over Taiwan Appears Not Only Inevitable, But Imminent”, Byline Times, 8 October 2021, <https://bylinetimes.com/2021/10/08/a-us-china-war-over-taiwan-appears-not-only-inevitable-but-imminent/>] -Chinmay

Two years ago, in what would be his first major speech on Taiwan, Chinese President Xi Jinping warned that Taiwan’s reunification was inevitable, saying that “we make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means” and that “Taiwan’s independence goes against the trend of history and will lead to a dead end”. Earlier this week, Taiwan’s Defence Minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, said that military tensions between China and Taiwan are at their highest in four decades, warning that Beijing will be in a position to launch a full-scale invasion in 2025. “For the military, the current situation is the grimmest in the more than 40 years since I joined the service,” he told Parliament. “It is capable now, but it has to calculate what it would cost, and what kind of outcome it wishes to achieve.” He warned that even a single “miscalculation” or “slight carelessness” could spark a full-blown crisis. While nearly the entire academic field of international relations has long predicted war between a rising China and a declining US is inevitable because great-power war typically occurs at the “intersection of one hegemon’s rise and another’s decline” – otherwise known as Thucydides Trap – a growing chorus of security elites are arguing an inverse of this theory. “The United States needs to prepare for a major war, not because its rival is rising but because of the opposite,” argue Hal Brands, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Beckley, associate professor of political science at Tufts University. Drawing comparisons between Nazi Japan and Imperial Japan in the lead-up to the Second World War, they argue that China is reaching its most threatening point now because its economy and military production capacity has peaked at the same time that it is being increasingly shunned, condemned and isolated, as a result of its mishandling and cover-up of the Coronavirus pandemic outbreak, its persecution of its ethnic Uyghur minority, and aggressive military expansionism in the South China Sea and Himalayas. The recent multi-trillion-dollar collapse of property developer Evergrande, and the more recent billion-dollar collapse of another, Fantasia Holdings Group, reveals an economy drowning in a culmination of years of bad debt, poor decisions, corruption and negligence. These realities could force Beijing to take on a “now or never mentality… and grab what it can before it’s too late”, warn Brand and Beckley, who argue that “the most dangerous trajectory in world politics is a long rise followed by the prospect of a sharp decline”. Adding further humiliation to President Xi Jinping’s leadership was the unexpected but crushing defeat of the pro-China KMT party in last year’s Taiwanese presidential election. For all of these reasons, the US, along with the UK Australia, Japan and India are behaving in a manner that suggests their respective military leaders believe that war in the Taiwan Strait, and/or elsewhere in Indo Pacific is inevitable within the next decade, with the recent establishment of actual and would-be security alliances – AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Their collective beliefs and actions were vindicated by comments delivered in Chinese state media on Thursday, warning that the threat of war is “real” and that it “may be triggered at any time”. Ultimately, there are very few reasons to believe that a US-China war over Taiwan won’t materialise within this decade or the next – making the breakaway and sovereign island state arguably the most pivotal in international politics for the foreseeable future.

#### China plans to attack this fall

Feng ’22 (John Feng is a contributing editor at newsweek. , “China Planned Taiwan Invasion in Fall, Alleged Russian Intel Leak Claims,” March 16, 2022, <https://www.newsweek.com/china-planned-taiwan-invasion-fall-alleged-russian-intel-leak-claims-1688449>) -LM

Taiwan's top diplomat said he couldn't speak on the authenticity of a purported Russian intelligence document that claimed Chinese President Xi Jinping had plans to annex the island nation this fall. Joseph Wu, Taiwan's minister of foreign affairs, said on Wednesday that his country would have to prepare regardless. "No matter if or when China decides to attack us, we must always be ready to defend ourselves," he told reporters in Taipei. During a defense committee hearing in the island's legislature, Wu told lawmakers that he was aware of media reports about the document said to be written by an anonymous analyst with Russia's Federal Security Service calling themself "Wind of Change." The foreign minister said he wasn't able to verify the alleged FSB document, but said Taiwan's own intelligence services were closely monitoring relevant chatter. The letter in question is part of a series published by France-based Russian dissident Vladimir Osechkin, a human rights lawyer who runs gulagu-net.ru, a website documenting abuses in Russian jails. Osechkin claims to have received seven letters since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The FSB whistleblower has painted a detailed picture of fear and chaos inside Russia's principal intelligence service, where apparently none but a select few were aware of Putin's plans. Christo Grozev, the executive director of investigative journalism group Bellingcat, said earlier this month that his FSB contacts believe the whistleblower to be authentic, even if they didn't agree with the conclusions of his analysis. In the fourth letter to Osechkin, dated March 9, the author describes the difficult position in which Moscow has put Beijing because of Putin's decision to invade Ukraine, a move that united the West and turned Russia into such a pariah that China would find it hard to offer support. "Because of the war, Russia has such a negative image for a number of countries that the United States can easily push sanctions against China, at least with the Europeans, if it risks circumventing the sanctions on Russia," the letter read. "China depends on exports so much that, coupled with its dependence on commodity prices…this would be almost a fatal blow." The whistleblower continued: "Not only that: Xi Jinping was at least tentatively considering the capture of Taiwan in the autumn—he needs his own small victory in order to be re-elected for a third term—there is a colossal power struggle among the [party] elite. Now, after the events in Ukraine, this window of opportunity has shut, which gives the United States the opportunity to both blackmail Xi and negotiate with his [political] rivals on favorable terms."

#### Xi will invade – re-election

Zhang ’21 (Dr. Junhua Zhang is a senior associate at the European Institute for Asian Studies. He has been a professor of political science at the School of International and Public Affairs of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Zhejiang University for 10 years. , “Xi Jinping’s headaches multiply before reelection,” DECEMBER 7, 2021, <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/xi-jinping-challenges/>) -LM

While China has been able to make great technological strides of its own in recent years, what has really helped its advancement is its access to Western innovations. During President Xi’s next two terms, that access is likely to be significantly restricted. Once China can no longer easily use and copy American, European and Japanese tech to boost its own industries, the government will need to find ways other than increasing productivity to raise revenue – for example by increasing taxes. The tax burden in China is already hefty, and adding to the weight will likely hurt the poor more than benefit them. Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, President Xi is an ambitious man who constantly feels the need to demonstrate his infallibility. This desire is not only in his nature, but is dictated by the immense pressure he is under – and the more he centralizes power in his own hands, the greater that pressure becomes. Once President Xi is “reelected,” the uncertainties regarding China’s economy and foreign policy will multiply. If the economy falters, he will want to draw the country’s attention to other issues – Taiwan is the low-hanging fruit here. For at least the next three years, however, retaking Taiwan by force will prove too costly for China. On the other hand, Beijing could achieve two goals by taking Pratas Island first, which is currently occupied by Taiwan. That type of operation would allow China to flex its military muscle vis-a-vis Taiwan, while potentially deterring neighbors or Western nations from pushing too hard against its claims in the South China Sea. At the same time, Beijing will further intensify its pressure on Taipei by blacklisting prominent figures and institutions it sees as favoring Taiwanese independence, hoping to strong-arm the island into compliance.

### 2AC --- No Invasion

#### A Taiwan invasion will never happen – China’ shortcomings make it incapable

**Cohen ’21** [Michael A. Cohen, Cohen (Ph.D., University of Chicago) is an American academic who is the Director of the International Affairs Program at The New School. He also works as Advisor to the Dean of the Faculty of Architecture, Design, and Urban Planning of the University of Buenos Aires., “No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan”, The New Republic, November 19, 2021, [https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan]-](https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan%5d-) kassounian

The United States has long played a key role in the territorial dispute. It initially signed a bilateral defense agreement with Taiwan in 1954 and over the years supplied the island with armaments. Even after recognizing the Chinese Communist government in Beijing in 1979, the U.S. has adhered to position of “strategic ambiguity” when it comes to the question of an American response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. But today, with U.S.-Chinese relations at one of the lowest points in recent memory—and as the Chinese military takes increasingly provocative military actions toward Taiwan—the fears of war have increased. So, too, have the calls for the U.S. to ratchet up its efforts to defend Taiwan, including the potential use of military force. The flames have been fanned by a host of military figures and foreign policy pundits. Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific, got the party started last March when he warned a Senate committee that China could invade Taiwan “in the next six years.”. Writing in *The Wall Street Journal,* former Trump Defense official Elbridge Colby [ramped up the threat-mongering by declaring](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fight-for-taiwan-could-come-soon-china-navy-defense-11635349097), “Beijing has made clear it is willing to use force to take Taiwan.… And this isn’t mere talk. The Chinese military has rehearsed amphibious attacks, and commercial satellite imagery shows that China practices large-scale attacks on U.S. forces in the region.” In the Bible of the foreign policy establishment, *Foreign Affairs,* Orianna Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, [warned](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation) that “whereas Chinese leaders used to view a military campaign to take the island as a fantasy, now they consider it a real possibility.” Yes, [China could invade Taiwan](https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/yes-china-could-invade-taiwan), says the Heritage Foundation. And Taiwan’s top defense official—perhaps not surprisingly—warned recently that China will be able to mount [a “full-scale” invasion of Taiwan](https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/06/asia/taiwan-defense-minister-china-attack-intl-hnk/index.html) by 2025.Some U.S. policymakers have taken these warnings to heart. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton has called for the U.S. to end its policy of “strategic ambiguity” and make clear its willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley warned recently that “if China takes control of Taiwan, Beijing will be emboldened to seize other territories around the globe” and called on the U.S. to increase pressure on China, including a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics scheduled to be held in Beijing. But how legitimate are these fears? Is the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan a serious and urgent concern? The answer is “not very.” And it’s a view, ironically, endorsed by the Pentagon. Earlier this month, the Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” While the report lays out the ways in which China’s “People’s Liberation Army” is seeking to modernize its forces, the threat to Taiwan of armed invasion is still minimal at best: Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRC’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. One might expect that a country intent on launching the largest and most difficult amphibious invasion in history would be making intense preparations. That’s not happening. As the Pentagon report notes, Chinese naval investments have focused on building up the capacity to launch “regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault.” The Pentagon also finds that while China is focusing on conducting joint operations that involve forces from the army, navy, and air force, as of present it currently lacks such capabilities. The soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. That the Chinese military enjoys vast military superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan is not in doubt. But that such resources can be used to mount an amphibious assault is something else altogether. The Chinese military last fought a war in 1979 against Vietnam, and the PLA was badly bloodied. That means that the soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. China’s own media outlets have, according to the Pentagon, noted the PLA’s shortcomings, which include that “commanders cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational decisions; (4) deploy forces; and, (5) manage unexpected situations.” These problems would be challenging enough in a conventional conflict. For a complex invasion of Taiwan, they would render such efforts virtually impossible. One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.”

## AT: Philippines Add-on

### AT: Philippines Key

#### Philippines are not a strategic partner.

Bandow ’21 (Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times, “The Philippines: America’s Perpetually Useless Ally”, CATO Institute, April 28 2021, https://www.cato.org/commentary/philippines-americas-perpetually-useless-ally)-BS

China has parked its fishing fleet in waters claimed by the Philippines. Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte has fulminated ineffectively. So far, at least, the Biden administration has declined to go to war on Manila’s behalf. But the possibility remains so long as the U.S. foolishly guarantees Philippine security. Indeed, some things never change. One is the limited value of the Philippines as an ally. Its people are friendly and welcoming — and quite pro‐​American. But it is a semi‐​failed state with a military to match. Manila is a sad example of how the US has picked up the old German habit of allying with the least stable nations possessing the weakest militaries — as Berlin did with Austro‐​Hungary in World War I and Italy in World War II. In the case of Washington the primes useless partner is the Philippines. The relationship wouldn’t matter so much if Manila didn’t expect America to protect not only its home islands, but also every useless piece of rock claimed by the Philippines against China, such as Scarborough Shoal. If Beijing and Washington end up at war — a horrific possibility — the cause should be more serious than the Philippines. Manila is as an American ally because of blatant US imperialism. The early Americans revolted against empire and eschewed overseas adventurism as they overspread the North American continent. However, the Sirens of Asia attracted Washington. After the US went to war with Spain, formally to liberate Cuba promoted by a simultaneously scurrilous and scandalous “Yellow Press” propaganda campaign, American forces seized the Philippines as well. Famed imperialists declared that the oceans made the archipelago contiguous, and thus an appropriate target of annexation. Washington should drop its defense guarantee and begin negotiations to turn the faux mutual defense treaty into a real treaty of mutual cooperation. Alas, the Filipinos had other ideas, having already launched a domestic independence movement. What followed was three years of ruthless irregular warfare, featuring “concentration zones,” which US soldiers compared to Washington’s veritable extermination campaigns against native Americans. War crimes mixed with starvation to kill 200,000 or more Filipino civilians. Resentment long lingered, especially in some Muslim‐​majority islands, such as Mindanao, where armed opposition to the central government continues. Even Duterte raised the issue, demanding the return of the famed Balangiga Bells, taken as war booty and which, he reasonably contended, “are reminders of the gallantry and heroism of our forebears … who resisted the American colonization and sacrificed their lives in the process.” Washington finally granted the archipelago’s independence in 1946, after the Philippines’ liberation from Japan. The US approved the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which, like similar agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Europe (NATO), effectively ran only one way, committing the US to defend the Philippines. Four decades later a deteriorating bilateral relationship and volcanic eruption pushed America out of both Clark Airfield and Subic Bay. The departure was long overdue. The archipelago obviously matters not at all to defending America itself. Washington would prefer that Manila rather than Beijing control resources and waterways in the region, but the practical impact on the US is marginal. Base access always is useful. However, no Philippine president, even one calmer and friendlier than Rodrigo Duterte, would likely make his or her nation available for American military operations against the PRC except to defend against an unlikely attack on the archipelago. Aiding America against Beijing would make the Philippines a permanent enemy of China, which will always be close by.

### AT: Presence Deters China

#### US presence in the SCS is destabilizing – causes war

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War between China and the US is not inevitable. But it is becoming increasingly likely, and the South China Sea bears its seeds.In their meeting on Monday in Tianjin, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman that China had [three bottom lines](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3142612/china-us-draw-lines-sand-top-level-meeting-agree-keep-talking?module=lead_hero_story_1&pgtype=homepage): **“**The United States must not challenge or seek to subvert China’s model of governance; it must not interfere in China’s development; and it must not violate China’s sovereignty or harm its territorial integrity.” The US continues to do all three. Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Xie Feng “expressed [China’s] strong dissatisfaction towards the wrong remarks and actions of the US” regarding the origins of Covid-19, Taiwan, [Xinjiang](https://www.scmp.com/knowledge/places/xinjiang?module=inline_auto&pgtype=article), Hong Kong and the South China Sea. US President Joe Biden has publicly [identified](https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/25/politics/biden-autocracies-versus-democracies/index.html;%20https:/www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3142130/xi-believes-autocracies-will-fare-better-democracies-says) what he considers a long-term existential threat to Americans’ fundamental political beliefs and way of life. He says autocracies like China and Russia are betting that their systems will out-compete democracies in addressing the enormous complex challenges of the 21st century. He explained that they think democracies, with their unwieldy checks and balances, will not be able to function efficiently and effectively to meet these challenges. In short, they think that they can satisfy their populaces by providing continuity and stability and thus human security rather than Western-style unrestricted individual freedoms and resultant chaos and insecurity. So, the two are on a fundamental collision course driven by competing ideologies and visions of the “international order.”Although it is still possible to compromise and co-exist, neither is inclined to do so. The “threat” of China now drives US foreign policy. The US is applying “whole of government” pressure on China – instituting sanctions because of what it considers unfair economic practices, theft of intellectual property, cyber hacking, its harsh treatment of minorities in Xinjiang, its political crackdown in Hong Kong and its bullying in the South China Sea.

### AT: SCS Goes Nuclear

#### **China will not use nuclear weapons in the SCS**

Quiggin ’21 [John Quiggin, Australian economist, a Professor and Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland. He is a Fellow of numerous learned bodies including the Econometric Society, and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, “Myths that stir trouble in the South China Sea”, theinterpreter, Dec 23 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myths-stir-trouble-south-china-sea>] -Chinmay

In 1964, when China first tested nuclear weapons, Mao Zedong used to claim that the country was populous enough to survive an all-out nuclear attack. His successors are under no such illusion. And Mao’s statement was made in the context of announcing a “no first strike” policy, to which China has adhered ever since. There is no evidence that China has any intention of using nuclear weapons except as a deterrent to a nuclear attack by another power The mutual sabre-rattling associated with South China Sea mythology is beneficial to a variety of actors in the United States, China and elsewhere. The military-industrial complex, against which President Eisenhower warned 60 years ago, is powerful in every country, and always seeks to promote preparation for large-scale war as well as the routine use of military power for political and commercial ends. Nationalist politicians promote territorial claims of all kinds, and exaggerate their importance. And both Chinese and Taiwanese governments have good reasons to keep the idea of an invasion of Taiwan alive.